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Abstract 
 
This study aims to respond to recent calls for a better understanding of the factors that 
support the effectiveness of formal control practices in hospitals. Based on survey data 
from 117 top-level managers in Belgian hospitals, the study investigates the 
performance effects of the alignment between the use of performance measurement 
systems (PMS), strategic priorities, and the particular role top-level managers’ personal 
background plays in this context. The quantitative results suggest that it is the top-level 
managers’ personal background that brings to life the benefits of the alignment between 
the use of PMS and strategic priorities in hospitals. Specifically, this paper shows that 
when the emphasis on partnership or governance strategic priority is high, the effect of 
the interactive use of PMS on hospital performance is more positive for top-level 
managers with a clinical background than for those with an administrative background. 
This study offers value for practitioners in that it supports the argument that hospitals 
can benefit from involving physicians in the top-level management team. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Hospitals face growing regulatory and competitive pressures to develop management 
control systems (Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013). However, formal management control 
systems (MCS) are seen to be problematic in hospitals (Aidemark and Funck, 2009). 
Questions about the use of monetary incentives for goal congruence, the power of physicians 
and nurses over operational processes, various priorities imposed by a large diversity of 
influential stakeholders, and austere budgets that constrain expansion and restructuring 
combine to create unparalleled complexities for the effective use of MCS (Abernethy et al., 
2007). Previous research in management accounting thus calls for a better understanding of 
MCS in hospitals (e.g., Bai et al., 2010; King and Clarkson, 2015), especially factors that 
influence the effectiveness of formal performance measurement systems (PMS) (Ballantine et 
al., 1998; Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013).2 
Over the past two decades, the literature on MCS in hospitals has emphasised the 
importance of aligning the use of MCS with hospital strategies (e.g., Aidemark and Funck, 
2009; Ballantine et al., 1998; Chilingerian and Sherman, 1987; Wardhani et al., 2009), an 
alignment that should lead to positive organisational outcomes, such as hospital performance 
                                                 
2
 Management control systems are defined as “formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain 
or alter patterns in organisational activities” (Simons, 1995, p. 5). Formal performance measurement systems are an essential 
aspect of formal management control systems (Chenhall, 2005; Henri, 2006). 
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(King et al., 2010). Inherent in these arguments is the implicit assumption that the individual 
behaviour of clinicians dominating the core operations of a hospital can be controlled towards 
the successful achievement of hospital strategies. However, several management accounting 
studies (e.g., Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991, 1995; Jones, 2002) report that regular 
conflicts between the professional objectives of administrators and clinicians curtail the 
effectiveness of MCS. Coombs (1987, p.391) notes that bureaucratic control mechanisms 
attempted by administrators have “the potential to substantially affect the motivations and 
practices of a relatively cohesive and powerful occupational group who frequently defend 
their professional autonomy quite effectively”. Therefore, our knowledge of how PMS are 
effectively used to support hospital strategies remains incomplete and fragmented. 
In the hospital management literature, significant attention has concentrated on the role 
of “doctor managers” (i.e., managers with a clinical background) in the management team 
and the implications for hospital effectiveness (Bai and Krishnan, 2014). Previous empirical 
findings suggest that greater participation of doctors in management teams is positively 
associated with increasing engagement in quality improvement initiatives and improved 
strategic decisions (Veronesi et al., 2013). In contrast, there are relatively few empirical 
studies in the management accounting literature that assess the effectiveness of PMS used by 
doctor managers, despite clear evidence that the use of bureaucratic control mechanisms in 
hospitals differs according to the top-level managers’ personal background (Abernethy et al., 
2007). This paper aims to fill this gap. 
We suggest that the involvement of doctor managers in the use of PMS is likely to 
affect dialogue between top-level managers and clinicians and is one potential solution for an 
effective use of PMS in the support of certain hospital strategies. These top-level managers 
with a clinical background, educated and socialised with different values and perspectives 
than top-level managers with an administrative background, would preserve freedom in 
professional and medical judgement and at the same time address the financial and 
organisational concerns of the physicians. Therefore, this paper seeks to extend previous 
studies at the interface between MCS and hospital strategy and to explore how top-level 
managers with different personal backgrounds (i.e., clinical vs. administrative) use PMS to 
successfully support hospital strategies. 
In line with previous studies on MCS-strategy relationships in a healthcare setting (e.g., 
Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007), we explore two 
dimensions of the use of PMS, namely, diagnostic and interactive, which have been 
extensively described by Simons (1995, 2000). A diagnostic use of PMS entails formal, 
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information-based routines and procedures that emphasise the development of critical 
performance variables to translate the organisation’s intended strategy, identify pre-set 
performance targets, measure deviations, and implement corrective actions. In contrast, an 
interactive use of PMS (e.g., Henri, 2006; Marginson, 2002; Widener, 2007) involves top-
level and operating managers using formal, information-based routines and procedures to 
debate face-to-face, with a focus on strategic uncertainties, in a non-invasive, facilitative, and 
inspirational manner (Bisbe et al., 2007). 
In this study, we build on management control theory, mostly focused on healthcare 
organisations, to develop and test two research models: (i) a preliminary MCS-strategy fit 
model detailing the joint effect of strategic priorities and use of PMS on hospital 
performance, and (ii) a more comprehensive model detailing the joint effect of strategic 
priorities, use of PMS, and personal background on hospital performance. The first research 
model aims to examine whether adopting a contingency-based perspective helps predict the 
effectiveness of PMS in the healthcare sector. The objective of the second research model is 
to explore the role of top-level managers’ personal background, identified as important in 
understanding behaviour in hospitals, in MCS-strategy relationships. We test the two research 
models with survey data from 117 top-level hospital managers in Belgian hospitals. 
Our study contributes to the extant management accounting and healthcare literatures 
by producing empirical evidence on the use of MCS by healthcare managers. This research 
improves our understanding of factors that influence the effectiveness of PMS in hospitals, 
recognising different strategic priorities and the tensions that emerge when doctors engage in 
management. Additionally, our findings shed more light on the complex relationships that 
exist between individual, structural and contextual variables and hospital performance. 
Specifically, we propose and present quantitative evidence that the personal background of 
top-level managers is an important moderator of the relationship among the use of PMS, 
strategic priorities, and organisational effectiveness in healthcare. Hence, this research calls 
for caution in generalising the expected effects of MCS on hospital performance and 
identifies scenarios for reconciling different perspectives on how PMS should be effectively 
used in hospitals through the explicit consideration of personal background. This study also 
extends previous research by developing a more comprehensive and integrated model 
specifying the background of the performance information user under which PMS use and 
strategic priorities will produce favourable outcomes. There has been relatively little 
empirical evidence on this relationship in the literature to date. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. After we review the literature on 
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hospital strategy, the styles of PMS use, the effects of strategy and PMS on performance, and 
top-level managers’ personal background, we formulate and explain the research hypotheses. 
The subsequent section presents the research design, variable measures, and validity analyses. 
This section is then followed by the presentation of results. Finally, we provide conclusions, 
limitations, and some research extensions. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Hospital strategy 
 
Empirical research in management and accounting notes the implications of strategic 
orientation for managerial practices (e.g., Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Ittner et al., 
2003; Mintzberg, 1990; Porter, 1980) and other elements of the control systems in hospitals 
(Abernethy and Lillis, 2001). A relevant stream of literature (e.g., Abernethy and Brownell, 
1999; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007) uses Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic patterns, 
classified as prospectors, analysers, and defenders. Others use Porter’s (1980) framework to 
examine strategy contributions to control system designs (e.g., Pizzini, 2006).3 However, 
there is general congruence between Miles and Snow’s and Porter’s categories (Langfield-
Smith, 2007; Shortell et al., 1990), although Porter’s (1980) framework is difficult to adapt to 
professional service organisations because of its central focus on product characteristics 
(Chenhall, 2005), limited representation of multidimensional organisational strategies (Ittner 
and Larcker, 2001), and inability to discriminate cost leaders from differentiators in 
quantitative empirical research (Langfield-Smith, 2007). 
Previous literature also offers healthcare-specific strategic frameworks (e.g., Goldstein 
et al., 2002; Nath and Sudharshan, 1994; Wells and Banaszak-Holl, 2000). Zelman and 
Parham (1990) characterise four strategies hospitals use to define their business focus (i.e., 
generalist, market specialist, service specialist, or super specialist). Recognising that each 
business can undertake a strategic orientation, Butler et al. (1996) also synthesise Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) pattern with hospital-specific strategic orientations: pacesetter hospitals are at 
the forefront of medical knowledge and technology, pacemaker hospitals are at (or near) the 
                                                 
3
 According to this framework, firms have two strategic priorities, representing two extreme points on a spectrum: low cost 
production to be a cost leader or superior product quality, flexibility, customer service, delivery, and design to achieve 
differentiation leadership (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998). 
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state of the art in every department offered, and provider hospitals are usually small and 
emphasise operations management and cost control as key to their competitive strategy. 
However, hospitals often use multiple strategies simultaneously rather than adopting a 
single set of stable practices focused on a sole strategy (Goldstein et al., 2002), largely 
because of the coercive influences of various powerful stakeholders with diverse and 
complex objective functions and work methods (Abernethy et al., 2007; Chenhall, 2007; 
Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2007). These stakeholders include local authorities, central 
governments, public sickness funds, private insurance companies, pharmaceutical 
corporations, universities, monastic orders, donors, patient groups, and nurses and physicians 
with multiple hospital affiliations, to name a few. Because these parties exert pressures on 
hospitals to shape how they allocate and manage resources (Braithwaite, 2004; Cardinaels 
and Soderstrom, 2013), hospitals are constrained to place emphases on various strategic 
priorities. Strategic priorities are diverse (e.g., Brown et al., 2005; Joshi et al., 2003); 
therefore the existence, importance, and relationship of each strategic priority with a style of 
PMS use should not be identical. To improve our understanding of how hospital strategies 
affect styles of PMS use, we specify separate strategic priorities in this study. 
According to organisation theory (Diesing, 1962; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Smith et 
al., 1985), priorities are organisational concerns that can be observed by focusing on the 
organisational attention and resources deployed. Smith et al. (1985) argue that authors 
drawing on this theory usually describe very similar typologies of priority, typically 
containing a rational goal category (i.e., planning and setting organisational goals for 
improved productivity and efficiency), an internal process category (i.e., coordinating and 
distributing information and communication for stability and security), an open system 
category (i.e., developing flexibility and readiness for resources acquisition and external 
support), and a political support category (i.e., maintaining cohesion and morale for a better 
human resources development). These categories of priorities are useful in terms of 
identifying strategic priorities in hospitals. Drawing an analogy with these categories based 
on the hospital management literature (e.g., Adler et al., 2003; Brown et al., 2005; Butler and 
Leong, 2000), strategic priorities in hospitals are organisational concerns with a long-term 
perspective that designate ways to create expectations and values for hospital stakeholders. 
Hence, four strategic priorities in hospitals can be identified: 
• Administration. This strategic priority involves monitoring the costs and productivity of 
hospital internal resources (e.g., finance, human) to maintain a basic financial viability 
(Abernethy et al., 2007; Shortell et al., 1985). This day-to-day result-oriented focus is 
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increasingly important for all modern hospitals due to recent regulatory and 
competitive changes in the industry (Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2007; Vandenberghe, 
1999). 
• Operations. This strategic priority focuses on ensuring the hospital’s internal 
operational activities, such as patient care, research and education, and meeting safety 
and quality requirements, which reflect an important long-term priority for hospitals 
(Brown et al., 2005; Goldstein et al., 2002; Nath and Sudharshan, 1994; Young et al., 
1992). This priority involves the ongoing effort to improve valuable, high quality 
services that meet or exceed patient expectations (Carman et al., 2010). 
• Partnership. This strategic priority addresses the process of managing a hospital’s 
formal boundary-spanning activities. In response to recent developments that move 
modern medicine increasingly outside hospitals, this strategic priority seeks to integrate 
and coordinate different health delivery organisations and self-employed professionals 
to build an integrated health delivery system such that a hospital’s healthcare activities 
are complementary to those of its partners (Lega, 2007). Emphasising a partnership 
priority allows hospitals to realise economies of scale, support innovation, share 
administrative services, and remain structurally independent (D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 
1987; Fauré and Rouleau, 2011; Goes and Park, 1997; Provan, 1984), all of which 
require a long-term outlook. 
• Governance. This strategic priority involves implementing administrative rules and 
legal regulations that describe the rights and duties of each employee. An emphasis on 
governance ensures that hospitals are accountable for their recruiting, hiring, and 
promotion practices because they recruit and promote people into specific positions in a 
way that ensures they possess the expertise, skills, and experience required for those 
positions (Bunderson et al., 2000). Governance is a contemporary strategic concern 
(Brown et al., 2005; Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2007; Young et al., 1992) because of the 
need to safeguard the continuity of historical healthcare values, address increased 
hospital scale and scope, and move from healthcare supply to patient demand (Eeckloo 
et al., 2004). 
 
Although recent health system reforms broadly observed in many Western countries 
follow the same pattern (Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2007; Cutler, 2002), variations between 
national healthcare systems and policy contexts can potentially lead to different professional 
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responses to these reforms (Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013). Thus, after considering the 
literature, we explored these various complex and highly context-dependent categories, 
represented in the contemporary meaning and importance of hospital priorities, in discussions 
with industry experts in the Belgian national healthcare context4 to verify the suitability of 
these categories in literature to a particular setting (see the “Research methodology” section). 
It emerged from these discussions that administration priority constitutes a common (non-
strategic) platform developed by most Belgian hospitals, regardless of the specific long-term 
directions pursued by the hospital. This administration category therefore constitutes a (non-
strategic) priority in Belgium5. 
In our research setting, we do not assume that contemporary hospitals pursue only one 
strategic priority at any given time; rather, we acknowledge that they are often pressed to 
implement various strategic priorities simultaneously (Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2006). 
These categories thus are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
 
2.2. Styles of PMS use 
 
Pressures on hospitals (e.g., from policymakers, patients, and insurance companies) to 
account for and improve their effectiveness and efficiency have prompted the widespread 
emergence of PMS (e.g., balanced scorecard, traditional financial performance measurement 
tools, tableau de bord, and performance prism) as a facet of MCS (Van der Geer et al., 2009). 
These systems comprise financial, strategic, and operational metrics (Bisbe and Malagueño, 
2012; Ittner and Larcker, 1998) designed to capture various hospital activities to facilitate 
planning and decision-making as well as to produce desired hospital outcomes effectively 
(Abernethy et al., 2007). Not only are PMS widely used in practice (Ittner and Larcker, 1998; 
                                                 
4
 Hospitals are critical to the Belgian economy, accounting for approximately 11% of the Belgian gross domestic product (the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] average is 9.6%) and with an average annual growth rate of 
4% in the first decade of the twenty-first century (OECD, 2011). 
5
 In Belgium, there are private (non-profit) and public hospitals. In both cases, healthcare is largely publicly financed (more than 
80%) (see Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2005). In this institutional environment, all hospitals are pressed to conform to the 
administration system imposed by the government and adopt this same short-term organisational priority, regardless of specific 
value creation for hospital stakeholders. Our sample seems to confirm this Belgian institutional environment. The raw scores 
on strategic priorities (average of all items used for calculating factor scores as described in Table 2) range from 1.00 to 
5.00, with a median for the total sample of 3.75. This suggests that hospital managers’ emphases on different strategic 
priorities vary greatly across organisations. An exception seems to be the administration priority. Of the 117 observations in 
our final sample, 86 present raw scores for administration priority above the median. For the other priorities, the results show 
fewer than 52 observations per strategic priority to be above the median. The abundant number of respondents who have 
highly rated items associated with administration priority provides some evidence that the administration priority constitutes 
a common (non-strategic) platform across all hospitals, regardless of specific value creation for hospital stakeholders. 
Therefore, we excluded the administration category from the strategic priorities and do not formulate a hypothesis on the 
indirect effect of the administration priority on hospital performance. 
9 
 
Widener, 2007), but they appear to have become important to the management of hospitals 
(Adler et al., 2003; Li and Benton, 1996). 
We turn to Simons’ (1995) framework to describe styles of PMS use in hospitals. This 
framework, which describes styles of MCS use (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004) and 
incorporates the notion of organisational strategy (Kober et al., 2007; Marginson, 2002; 
Widener, 2007), has been tested empirically (e.g., Widener, 2007) in hospital settings (e.g., 
Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007). The framework describes two styles of PMS use, namely, 
diagnostic and interactive, reflecting opposite forces of routines and procedures, respectively 
(Henri, 2006; Marginson, 2002; Mundy, 2010). When managers make diagnostic use of 
MCS, the formal, information-based routines and procedures lead them to establish 
guidelines, identify performance variables and targets, measure any deviations from this 
performance level, and take corrective actions. This traditional feedback system, typically 
viewed as an “answer machine” (Burchell et al., 1980), primarily reflects a cybernetic use of 
routines and procedures because it denotes a self-correcting mechanism that tends to reduce 
any deviations from pre-set standards of performance, contributes to a top-down strategy 
execution, standardisation, and efficiency (Simons, 1995) and because organisational 
attention to new opportunities is limited (Mintzberg, 1990). 
In contrast, when managers use MCS interactively, the formal information-based 
routines and procedures encourage debate to resolve strategic uncertainties and inspire 
organisational members (Bisbe et al., 2007). Instead of the answer machine of the diagnostic 
method, we observe a “learning machine,” in that members use these routines “to explore 
problems, ask questions, explicate presumptions, analyse the analysable and finally resort to 
judgement” (Burchell et al., 1980, p. 14-15). Therefore, unlike diagnostic use, interactive use 
represents an opposite force of routines and procedures because it designates a self-
reinforcing technique that seeks to promote innovation by offering a higher degree of 
freedom of actions, encourages the development of bottom-up strategies and experimentation 
of new ideas (Simons, 1995), and emphasises organisational attention to opportunities for 
learning (Mintzberg, 1990). 
 
2.3. Effects of strategy and PMS on performance 
 
An extensive research tradition, rooted in the contingency literature, investigates the 
impact of the fit between MCS and strategy on organisational performance (Chenhall, 2007; 
Langfield-Smith, 2007; Tucker et al., 2009). This literature stream first suggests that the 
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execution of any set of strategic priorities within the same organisation may rely on the 
combination of different uses of MCS; different strategic priorities require particular uses of 
MCS to support their achievement (Govindarajan, 1988). For example, Ahrens and Chapman 
(2004) suggest that the mechanistic and organic characteristics of MCS can be combined to 
help achieve a set of efficiency- and flexibility-related priorities. In addition, Simons (1987) 
provides empirical evidence that although firms prioritising efficiency rely more on the 
diagnostic uses of MCS, firms prioritising flexibility place more emphasis on the interactive 
use of MCS. Similarly, Widener (2007) shows that operational uncertainties have the largest 
impact on the diagnostic use of PMS; competitive uncertainties better explain their interactive 
use. Moreover, the MCS-strategy fit literature suggests that different uses of PMS instil 
different behaviours and that aligning the use of PMS to strategic priorities facilitates 
effective strategy execution, thereby improving organisational performance (Chenhall, 2005; 
Ittner et al., 2003; Van der Stede et al., 2006; Verbeeten and Boons, 2009).  
Previous accounting studies, drawing on these contingency tenets in a healthcare 
setting, have empirically examined the interaction between hospital strategy and the use of 
MCS, such as management techniques aimed at improving hospital operations (Chilingerian 
and Sherman, 1987), total quality management programmes (Carman et al., 2010), budgeting 
systems (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999), and PMS (Ballantine et al., 1998) such as balanced 
scorecards (Aidemark and Funck, 2009). Other accounting studies have also focused on the 
performance effect of the alignment between hospital strategy and the use of MCS. For 
example, King et al. (2010) designed a cross-sectional research study with survey data from 
small private primary healthcare businesses, showing significant results linking contingency 
factors (such as strategy), budget use, and performance of healthcare organisations. 
Abernethy and Brownell (1999) in turn used questionnaire responses from CEOs of large 
public hospitals to provide empirical evidence that matching the style of budget use with 
strategic change leads to the highest performance. Finally, Kaplan (2001) reports longitudinal 
evidence of the positive impacts of developing and using a balanced scorecard for the 
strategy of Duke Children’s Hospital, a 138-bed in-patient facility. Although these findings, 
taken as a whole, help provide theoretical support to predict the performance effect of the 
interactions between the use of PMS and hospital strategic priorities, a limited number of 
studies have empirically tested this specific contingency relationship in hospitals. 
Much of this contingency literature implicitly assumes that all hospital members are 
committed to the achievement of hospital strategic priorities and will, therefore, adopt 
rational behaviour in line with bureaucratic control mechanisms designed to support these 
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priorities. However, another stream of literature sheds light on empirical evidence depicting 
regular tensions and conflicts between the professional objectives of administrators and 
clinicians viewed as ‘dominant professionals’ (Raelin, 1986), which prevent the effectiveness 
of these mechanisms. In this paper, we build on previous research (e.g., Abernethy, 1996; 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991) on the use of bureaucratic control mechanisms in hospitals 
and suggest that these two streams of research can be reconciled when integrating members 
of the medical profession within the management team.  
 
2.4. Top-level managers’ personal background 
 
The extant literature in strategic management helps explain strategic choice and courses 
of action by referring to the idiosyncrasies of top-level managers, such as their education and 
experience (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Managers’ actions are governed by their 
individual interpretations of the strategic situations they face, which in turn depend on their 
cognition, values, and personality (Hambrick, 2007). In this respect, courses of action can be 
explained by referring to the biases and dispositions of powerful actors in the organisation. 
Measuring top-level managers’ cognitive frames is a complicated task, but education and 
experience offer observable personal characteristics that can be appropriate proxies for 
psychological constructs (Carpenter et al., 2004), and thus might explain variations in 
organisational processes (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Smith et al., 1994) such as the uses of 
the performance information provided by MCS (Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2006). 
The behavioural relevance of personal backgrounds is widely accepted in management 
literature (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick, 2007; Von Nordenflycht, 2010) and increasingly 
acknowledged in management accounting literature (Schaeffer and Dossi, 2014). 
Specifically, top-level managers’ personal backgrounds represent their individual 
experiences, obtained over time, and summarised as their educational and work experience 
(Hambrick, 2007). Whereas education measures typically refer to diplomas (e.g., medical 
degree, MBA, military education) granted by a higher education institution, organisational 
researchers usually define work experience as the sum of events the person undergoes that 
relate to his or her job performance (Quiñones et al., 1995). Each event generates tacit and 
explicit knowledge that can be internalised or encouraged by organisational routines. The 
sum of events shapes idiosyncratic, individual features, which affect managers’ actions, 
decisions, and behaviours (Avolio et al., 1990). 
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In hospitals, top-level managers’ personal backgrounds can typically be classified as 
either clinical or administrative (Kurunmäki, 2004; Witman et al., 2010). Hospital managers 
with a clinical background are usually former physicians or healthcare providers who 
graduated from a medical school, thus suggesting an emphasis on autonomous (rather than 
team-based) and competitive (rather than cooperative) behaviours (Garman et al., 2006; Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). The length of their mandatory education, emphasis on high grade point 
averages, and need for extensive and complex professional knowledge lead to the substantial 
power and influence of this group of workers (Adler et al., 2003; Teece, 2003; Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). They accumulate professional experience through continuous 
involvement in the core operational activities of the hospital and routine contact with patients. 
This educational and professional experience shapes their interest in and knowledge of the 
primary processes of hospitals. In contrast, top-level managers with an administrative 
background have typically graduated from a business, economics, or law school and gain 
administrative experience with general, accounting, and financial management, rather than 
specific medical processes. These managers have likely been trained in accountability and 
control and are governed by performance indicators (Garman et al., 2006). 
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3. Hypotheses formulation 
 
In this section, we first develop hypotheses concerning the performance effect of the 
interactions between hospital strategic priorities (i.e., operations, partnership, and 
governance) and use of PMS (i.e., diagnostic and interactive). Secondly, we explore the 
extent to which our understanding of the performance effect of these interactions is improved 
by accounting for the different personal backgrounds of top-level hospital managers.6 
 
3.1. Joint effect of strategic priorities and use of PMS on hospital performance 
 
The emphasis placed by hospitals on operations priority ensures that valuable patient-
centred activities, such as patient safety, high-quality patient care delivery, and quality 
improvement, are achieved (Brown et al., 2005; Teisberg et al., 1994). Work rules and 
standardised procedures, with their emphasis on prescriptive guidance, are then developed, 
communicated, and tightly controlled (Langfield-Smith, 2007). In this respect, safety, quality 
assurance, and operating productivity can be captured by routine PMS (Flynn, 2002). The 
mechanistic logic behind the diagnostic use of PMS suggests that it supports operations 
priority. The diagnostic use of PMS requires performance measures to meet certain 
conditions. It must be possible to translate the strategic priority into set standards, allow for 
simple measures of actual outputs, support calculations of the deviations, and standardise 
procedures (Daft et al., 1988; Widener, 2007). Otherwise, performance measures could be 
unstable due to noise or imprecision (Banker and Datar, 1989). Managers look for variations 
between results and established standards on internal operations and then build a feedback 
channel to allow top-level managers to communicate exception reports on internal operations 
                                                 
6
 In this study, we hypothesise interaction effects rather than main effects because there is no a priori reason why a given 
hospital strategic priority, style of PMS use, or personal background, in itself, should have a positive or negative effect on 
hospital performance. The impact of each variable will be limited unless these variables are combined and interact. We 
summarise these expectations in H1–H6. Similarly, in this research, we do not hypothesise two-way interactions for the 
relationship between strategic priority and personal background and styles of PMS use and personal background. First, the 
combination of strategic priority and personal background alone might not result in enhanced performance. The best-laid 
strategic priority coupled with the most relevant personal background is not sufficient to achieve competitive advantage and 
lead to superior hospital performance unless top-level managers use management tools and other administrative mechanisms 
of effective strategy implementation (Govindarajan, 1988), such as PMS (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998). Second, 
performing well in terms of successfully achieving hospital objectives is not due to the combination of styles of PMS use 
and personal background itself. Operating in a healthcare context without the consideration of strategic priorities creates 
ambiguity for top-level managers with clinical and administrative backgrounds about where to commonly focus their 
attention and effort (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2006). These managers may not recognise 
the appropriate actions and decisions and could individually encourage separate developments of short-term priorities and 
unrelated local initiatives, which will prevent the successful achievement of organisational objectives of the hospital. 
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as well as how to get back on track (Widener, 2007), thus improving the decision-making 
process and facilitating the successful achievement of operations objectives (Chenhall, 2007). 
In a hospital setting, partnership and governance priorities appear largely unrelated to 
the diagnostic use of PMS. Performance measures reflecting these strategic priorities may 
facilitate discussions among top-level managers, but are unlikely to be sufficiently routine 
(Widener, 2007) or informative in regard to managerial actions and decisions (Hartmann, 
2000). Moreover, an increasing emphasis on governance priority implies reviewing the 
current structure (e.g., restructuring managerial roles and responsibilities) to pursue a new 
organisational structure focused on patients and their diagnoses (Hyer et al., 2009). This 
process leads top-level managers to adjust their traditional attributions of responsibilities (i.e., 
who is responsible for which performance measures) and the associated reward and 
incentives systems, which render the diagnostic use of PMS inappropriate. Similarly, the 
implementation of partnerships involves the creation and extension of interdependencies with 
partners, which also renders a rigid use of PMS inappropriate (Otley, 1980). In contrast, 
management control studies argue that to be successfully implemented, some strategic 
priorities seem to attach a great deal of importance to a combination of coordination, 
autonomy, decentralisation (Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000), and an adequate use of PMS 
(Verbeeten and Boons, 2009), which is central in hospitals in which medical services are 
strongly compartmentalised and powerful and influential actors are engaged in boundary-
spanning work.  
A partnership priority necessitates the use of a coherent set of performance metrics that 
assess strategic issues such as collaborations with academics and training facilities for human 
resource planning, vertical and horizontal integration, and relations with other healthcare 
providers or facilities (Brown et al., 2005; Gunasekaran, 2002). These measures are process-
oriented (cf., result-oriented) and suggest the need for liaisons to facilitate discussions of 
these measures among different functional managers. The interactive use of PMS, with its 
focus on face-to-face challenges and debates across the organisation as well as its non-
invasive, facilitative, and inspirational aims allows and stimulates the development of fluent 
vertical and horizontal liaison groups (Adler et al., 2003). According to the contingency 
literature, adopting an interactive use of PMS to develop a partnership priority enables top-
level managers to make decisions more effectively, thereby resulting in better hospital 
performance. 
Finally, hospital governance poses challenges to the orthodox power bases of 
physicians, nurses, and managers. Previous research notes that cultural and behavioural 
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reluctance present threats to top-level managers and boards trying to implement hospital 
governance (Flynn, 2002; Hackett et al., 1999). Physicians perceive hospital governance as 
threatening to their professional freedom and as a new top-down vehicle to impose 
managerialism, which increases the likelihood of goal conflicts. Management control theory 
suggests that such a strategic priority, which is not widely accepted by influential and 
powerful actors in the firm, needs to be complemented by organic controls, characterised by 
loose control over operations and open channels of communication (Burns and Stalker, 
1961). In a hospital setting, both Abernethy and Vagnoni (2004) and Naranjo-Gil and 
Hartmann (2006) show that top-level managers use accounting information systems 
interactively, which is an associated form of organic control (Henri, 2006), to address goal 
conflicts by enforcing communication, dialogue, and coordination, thereby leading to better 
hospital performance (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). This discussion suggests the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The emphasis placed by hospitals on operations priorities is positively 
associated with performance when top-level managers use performance measurement 
systems diagnostically. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The emphasis placed by hospitals on partnership priorities is positively 
associated with performance when top-level managers use performance measurement 
systems interactively. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The emphasis placed by hospitals on governance priorities is positively 
associated with performance when top-level managers use performance measurement 
systems interactively. 
 
3.2. Joint effect of strategic priorities, use of PMS, and personal background on 
hospital performance 
 
In this section, we hypothesise and explain that combining specific hospital strategic 
priorities with certain styles of PMS use will be more effective in terms of hospital 
performance when top-level managers’ personal backgrounds are considered in hospital 
management structure. In other words, the effects of personal background (i.e., clinical or 
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administrative) on hospital performance will be influenced by the emphasis placed on 
specific hospital strategic priorities and certain styles of PMS use. 
Superior hospital performance occurs when the information provided by PMS and 
appropriate individual experience helps top-level managers facilitate the implementation of 
hospital strategic priorities (Abernethy and Lillis, 2001). Because top-level managers’ 
personal background influences their attitudes towards information obtained from operations, 
partnership, and governance priority contexts, different personal backgrounds should relate 
systematically to organisational requirements for dealing with different hospital strategic 
priorities and styles of PMS use (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Joshi et al., 2003). 
Therefore, we examine whether top-level managers’ personal backgrounds are an important 
factor influencing the effectiveness of PMS in the support of strategic priorities. 
 
Operations priority, diagnostic use of PMS, and personal background 
 
We posit that an operations priority accompanied by a diagnostic use of PMS will be 
more effective in enhancing hospital performance when top-level managers present an 
administrative rather than clinical background. On the one hand, some empirical findings 
seem to suggest that clinical performance measures are closely monitored by former 
physicians with managerial activities (Andersen, 2009). Professionals and top-level managers 
with a clinical background share similar interests in diagnostic measures related to patient 
safety, high-quality patient care delivery, and quality improvement because both groups 
recognise the importance of aims that ultimately help cure people. This standardised 
procedure refers to the intra-occupational norms and values encouraged by the profession 
itself (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991). 
On the other hand, although top-level managers with an administrative background may 
have less specific expertise in regard to the development of standardised operating procedures 
that might be relevant for clinical tasks (Abernethy and Lillis, 2001; Llewellyn, 2001), they 
are more accustomed to dealing with abstract numbers, distant controls, and management-by-
exception. As such, they might be more suitable to monitor and coordinate the achievement 
of pre-established goals following a traditional mechanistic approach to control that focuses 
on correcting deviations from pre-set standards of performance. In line with this mechanistic 
reasoning related to traditional PMS (e.g., Henri, 2006), including tight controls over 
operations and highly structured communication channels (Burns and Stalker, 1961), top-
level managers with a clinical background—typically former physicians—may be reluctant to 
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impose formal mechanistic controls on their professional colleagues (Abernethy and Lillis, 
2001; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2006; Raelin, 1986). When executing operations priority, 
the importance of the medical habitus (i.e., the liturgy of the clinic with meetings, patient 
rounds and the importance of medical talk) and its associated dilemmas (e.g., professional 
identity, patient care vs. costs, time allocation on managerial activities vs. medical practice) 
(Witman et al., 2010) prevents them from an effective use of diagnostic measures. Top-level 
managers with an administrative background, in turn, are not influenced by this medical 
habitus and the associated dilemmas. Therefore, the diagnostic use of PMS when facing an 
operations priority is likely to be more effective when the information provided by PMS is 
used by top-level managers with an administrative rather than clinical background. 
 
Hypothesis 4. A three-way interaction among operations priority, top-level managers’ 
personal background, and diagnostic use of PMS explains performance: when the 
emphasis on operations priority is high and the personal background is administrative, 
the diagnostic use of PMS has the strongest positive relationship with performance. 
 
Partnership priority, interactive use of PMS, and personal background 
 
We predict that a partnership priority accompanied by an interactive use of PMS will be 
more effective in improving hospital performance when top-level managers present a clinical 
rather than administrative background. Performance measures associated with a partnership 
priority refer to issues such as integrating partners, aligning strategies, promoting 
connectivity, and developing partnerships, which require liaison devices to facilitate 
discussions between managers and partners and/or among functional managers (Fauré and 
Rouleau, 2011; Gunasekaran, 2002). Top-level managers with a clinical background should 
be more familiar with such process-oriented issues (Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2006) than 
their peers with an administrative background. These managers’ affiliations with multiple 
healthcare organisations and membership in the professional culture suggest that they can 
more easily handle collaborations with academic and training organisations, integrations of 
other healthcare organisations, and relations with healthcare providers (Brown et al., 2005; 
Gunasekaran, 2002) than can those with an administrative background. In this partnership 
context, the interactive use of PMS, with a focus on information exchange across different 
functional and hierarchical members of the hospital (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; 
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Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007), is likely to be more effective when top-level managers 
with a clinical background use it than when those with an administrative background do so. 
 
Hypothesis 5. A three-way interaction among partnership priority, top-level managers’ 
personal background, and interactive use of PMS explains performance: when the 
emphasis on partnership priority is high and the personal background is clinical, the 
interactive use of PMS has the strongest positive relationship with performance. 
 
Governance priority, interactive use of PMS and personal background 
 
We predict that a governance priority accompanied by an interactive use of PMS will 
be more effective in improving hospital performance when top-level managers present a 
clinical rather than administrative background. Adopting or improving hospital governance 
mechanisms, which physicians may perceive to be a threat to their professional freedom 
(Flynn, 2002; Hackett et al., 1999), necessitates more intense communication, dialogue, and 
coordination among physicians and managers to mitigate goal and relationship conflicts. The 
conflict could be aggravated when top-level managers with an administrative background try 
to implement this governance priority. Their initiatives could create the sense that they are 
trying to control physicians’ behaviour based on their formal authority and position in 
hierarchical structures. In contrast, physicians are more willing to accept and identify with 
these bureaucratic control mechanisms, such as PMS, used interactively to support 
governance priority when the user of these mechanisms has a clinical background reflecting 
shared professional values and objectives. We then expect fewer conflicts because they 
belong to the same professional group as the physicians they manage (Raelin, 1986). As a 
result, a decrease in goal and relationship conflicts leads to superior team member satisfaction 
and organisational performance (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). 
 
Hypothesis 6. A three-way interaction among governance priority, top-level managers’ 
personal background, and interactive use of PMS explains performance: when the 
emphasis on governance priority is high and the personal background is clinical, the 
interactive use of PMS has the strongest positive relationship with performance. 
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4. Research methodology 
 
4.1.  Design 
 
To understand different strategic priorities among hospitals, we relied on cross-
sectional field study research (Lillis and Mundy, 2005), specifically, preliminary qualitative 
field research followed by a quantitative empirical examination.7  
We initially conducted qualitative field research to develop a comprehensive view of 
the phenomenon (Yin, 1988). We contacted the chief executive officers (CEO) of two 
Belgian 8  hospitals (a university-affiliated 900+-bed hospital located in Brussels and a 
psychiatric 100+-bed hospital located in southern Belgium). With their support, we 
conducted individual tape-recorded face-to-face interviews on site (May–July 2009) with 
nine top-level managers (at both hospitals: the CEO, medical director, financial director, and 
human resources director; at the psychiatric hospital: the chief of nurses) and two external 
experts in the Belgian hospital sector (a former international hospital management expert at 
the Belgian Technical Cooperation Bureau and the founder of a Belgian consulting firm 
operating exclusively in the healthcare sector). These interviews took one hour on average 
and were semi-structured around a set of open-ended questions related to critical strategic 
issues for their hospital. Thus, we could also pose follow-up questions adapted to each 
strategy without losing the general interview direction. In light of existing literature, this 
approach led to the identification of 18 items that capture the critical priorities of Belgian 
healthcare organisations. In the second phase of this study, we included these items in a 
survey. 
For the hypothesis tests, we adopted a cross-sectional research design. The data were 
gathered in structured, written questionnaires (in either French or Dutch), sent to two 
members of the top-level management team (i.e., CEO and medical director [MD]9) of every 
                                                 
7
 Using qualitative inquiry before the distribution of the questionnaire as an integral part of developing concepts to be tested 
in subsequent phases is highly valued when “some constructs, such as task uncertainty and strategy, are highly 
contextualised and need to be constantly realigned with information from the field in order to avoid, for example, under-
specification of survey questions” (Lillis and Mundy, 2005, p. 121). 
8
 Due to potential variations between different national healthcare systems, the target sample is geographically restricted to one 
country. We chose Belgium as our research setting for accessibility reasons. Based on a close collaboration with a Belgian 
university, we had privileged contacts with top-level managers of Belgian hospitals and financial support for the development of 
a survey. 
9
 Previous research indicates that CEOs and MDs are well informed about how their hospitals use formal, information-based 
routines and procedures (Daft et al., 1988) as well as the importance of diverse strategic priorities (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). 
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Belgian hospital. 10  Before sending the questionnaire, we checked the validity of the 
translations by subjectively estimating question quality (Runkel and McGrath, 1972). First, 
our extensive literature review enabled us to identify and use previously validated scales to 
measure styles of PMS use and top-level managers’ personal backgrounds. Second, two 
bilingual accounting researchers (i.e., English–Dutch and English–French) translated the 
instruments. Third, eight academics with survey experience reviewed the written 
questionnaire for readability. 
Following Dillman et al. (2009), our quantitative data collection included four contacts: 
(1) a pre-notice letter (sent in September 2009), (2) the survey (one week later), (3) a follow-
up letter (two weeks later), and (4) a second copy of the survey (two weeks later). For each 
contact, the package was personally addressed. The goal of the first contact was to induce 
early interest and trust in the research. The mail package in the second step included a cover 
letter, the questionnaire (printed on thicker, coloured paper), and a prepaid reply envelope. To 
motivate respondents, we promised all participants a summary of the mean scores for each 
question and some statistical analyses to be sent after the data collection period. A postcard 
reminder was the first follow-up. The second follow-up included the questionnaire and a new 
cover letter, sent to only those who had not answered. We received 144 mailed questionnaires 
(of 387),11 for a response rate of 37.2%, which is similar to the rates reported in comparable 
studies (Van der Stede et al., 2005). Thirteen questionnaires had to be discarded: nine 
because they were incomplete and four because the hospitals they represented were too small 
to have formal control systems in place (i.e., fewer than 50 beds). Fourteen duplicated 
surveys completed by a second member of the same hospital’s top-level management team 
enabled us to assess inter-rater reliability. 12  Thus, we had 117 responses for hypothesis 
testing. We summarise the respondent profiles in Appendix A. 
We conducted two post hoc techniques to test for common method bias. First, 
Harman’s one-factor test resulted in eight factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, and no 
particular factor captured more than 22% of the total variance. The factors account for 68% 
of the total variance, which suggests common rater bias was not a concern. Second, we 
                                                 
10
 The official website of the Belgian Federal Public Service of Health, Food Chain Safety, and Environment features three 
lists (one per region) dating back to January 2009. The lists included 300 hospital campuses (195 different hospitals): 40 in 
Brussels, 159 in Flanders, and 101 in Wallonia. 
11
 Although we received 172 responses, 28 managers declined to participate, mostly because they lacked at least three years’ 
experience in their position. 
12
 The validation sample included 14 hospitals. We assessed inter-rater agreement using the average deviation (AD) index 
(Burke and Dunlap, 2002). For the five-item Likert scale, we estimated acceptable inter-rater agreement and practical 
significance at .83 (Burke and Dunlap, 2002). For all five-item Likert scale questions, the AD ranged from .20 to .76 for 
each hospital and from .21 to .79 for each questionnaire item. 
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calculated the first unrotated factor as a proxy for common method variance and subsequently 
used it as a control variable (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The results obtained for the hypothesised 
relationships, including the common method factor, were similar to those for our base 
models. 
To assess nonresponse bias, we first compared respondents with non-respondents in 
terms of hospital (i.e., size, diversity, region, type of hospital, and ownership status) and 
individual (i.e., position) characteristics. Then, we compared early and late respondents with 
respect to their strategic priorities (mean), diagnostic and interactive uses of PMS (mean), 
and personal background. The t-tests (for scale variables) and chi-square tests (for categorical 
variables) revealed no significant mean differences (p > .05, two-tailed), with the exception 
of one variable (partnership priority, p = .023). 
 
4.2. Variable measures 
 
To capture the importance of strategic priorities, we asked the survey respondents to 
indicate, on a five-point Likert-type scale, the extent to which various problems were the 
focus of management attention and resources, and considered to be of critical importance. 
With these individual scores, we ran an exploratory factor analysis (principal component with 
Varimax rotation) across the 18 items using the full dataset (n = 117) and extracted four 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (explaining 57.6% of the variance). We used the 
factor scores to describe the emphasis on strategic priority in the hospital. Three of these 
factors represent strategic issues, whereas the fourth accounts for only administration (non-
strategic) priority.13 Table 1 contains the questionnaire items, factor analysis, loadings, and 
reliability statistics for hospital strategic priorities and the diagnostic and interactive uses of 
PMS. 
To measure the diagnostic use of PMS, 14  we used the instrument Henri (2006) 
describes: respondents indicated, on a five-point scale, the extent to which they used a 
hospital scorecard to track progress towards goals, monitor results, compare outcomes with 
                                                 
13
 Six items did not load satisfactorily (λ < .6). The administration priority factor included four items: “Secure financial 
resources”, “Meet the hospital activity targets”, “Keep medical stars in the hospital”, and “Attain profitability or market 
share goals” (Cronbach’s α = .763). The second factor, operations priority, included three items, “Manage information 
systems,” “Reduce the administrative burden and red tape”, and “Develop internal control procedures”, that loaded on one 
factor (Cronbach’s α = .726). The partnership priority factor consisted of “Develop customer services or service support” 
and “Develop a reliable network of doctors or partnerships” (Cronbach’s α = .662). Finally, the fourth factor, referring to the 
governance priority, included “Find new top-level managers”, “Define the organisation roles, responsibilities and policies”, 
and “Define the roles and responsibilities of top-level managers” (Cronbach’s α = .814). 
14
 In the questionnaire, we described PMS as dashboards composed of a formal set of data on patients, pathologies, hospital 
activities, finance, and staff. 
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expectations, or review key measures. The output of an explanatory factor analysis revealed 
one factor (eigenvalue > 1), which indicated that this construct is unidimensional. The 
explained variance and Cronbach’s α were 68.3% and .845, respectively, which are well 
above the generally accepted cut-off values. 
For the interactive use of PMS, we applied Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann’s (2007) 
instrument (see also Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). This instrument was already adapted to 
the healthcare industry. Respondents indicated, on a five-point Likert-type scale, the extent to 
which they used a hospital scorecard for six types of managerial actions: to set and negotiate 
goals and targets, debate data assumptions and action plans, signal key strategic areas for 
improvement, challenge new ideas and ways of performing tasks, engage in discussion with 
subordinates, and use learning tools. These factor analysis results indicated that five items 
loaded on a single factor (explained variance = 55.3%). The remaining item was excluded 
from the final construct. A Cronbach’s α of .861 indicated the high internal consistency of the 
final construct. 
We measured top-level managers’ personal background with a factual question about 
their functional experience (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). We identified the respondents’ 
experience (clinical versus administrative) according to their response to the question “In 
which domain have you accumulated the most work experience?” Thus, we include a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the top-level manager has a clinical background and 0 
otherwise. 
For this research, “performance” refers to the effectiveness (goal attainment) of the 
hospital (e.g., Govindarajan, 1984). Noting the diversity of hospitals and the potential for 
widely divergent goals in our sample, we opted to use a multidimensional measure with six 
items related to overall hospital performance (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder, 1991): “Financial health”, “Ability to attract doctors and nurses”, “Reputation of 
the hospital”, “Undergraduate and graduate medical/health professional teaching”, 
“Research”, and “Quality of care” (patients’ readmission rate). The instrument asked 
respondents to exercise their personal judgements by ranking their organisation, on a three-
point scale, in terms of the extent to which the performance criteria listed were important and 
reflected the actual performance of the hospital. Scores for each dimension were determined 
by multiplying “importance” and “performance” scores. We calculated a final performance 
score by taking the weighted average of all items.15 
                                                 
15
 In this study, we acknowledge that measuring hospital performance based on top-level managers’ self-rating is unlikely to 
be straightforward and that a variety of objective measures have been used in previous research (e.g., after-tax return on total 
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Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
We included hospital size, status, practice type, respondent’s age, and location to 
control for potential structural differences. Hospital size referred to the number of beds 
(Abernethy and Lillis, 2001; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007). Hospital status equalled 1 for 
private hospitals and 0 for public hospitals. Practice type was measured as a dichotomous 
variable, equal to 1 for general practice and 0 otherwise. Hospital location is a dummy 
variable that equalled 1 if the hospital is located in Wallonia and 0 if it is located in Brussels 
or Flanders. We also entered the other three categories of priority into the regression analyses 
as control variables in testing Hypotheses 1–6 to control for the implications of conflicting 
effects of coexisting emphases in the same institution at a given time. 
 
4.3.  Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
We conducted confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to empirically verify discriminant 
validity. First, we tested alternative one-factor and four-factor models to confirm that 
strategic and non-strategic priorities were distinguishable constructs. Chi-square differences 
tested which model fits the data better. The results showed that the four-factor model 
provided a significantly better fit than the one-factor model (∆χ2 = 139.9, df = 6, p < .01). 
The two sets of fit indexes showed that the four-factor model (CFI = .91, IFI = .91, NFI = .83, 
RMSEA = .09) fit the data better than the one-factor model (CFI = .63, IFI = .64, NFI = .56, 
RMSEA = .17). 
Second, we checked for discriminant validity between the interactive and diagnostic 
uses of PMS. Although the conceptualisation of these two PMS uses has been well 
                                                                                                                                                        
assets, after-tax return on sales, hospital total sales growth, patient mortality, rate of occupancy, rotation ratio, length of stay, 
and patient satisfaction, to name a few). However, this diversity of measures also reflects the lack of consensus in the 
healthcare economics literature about what constitutes hospital effectiveness and quality (Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2007). 
Furthermore, such objective data are not easily comparable across private and public hospitals. In contrast, our instrument 
allows us to capture the multi-dimensional nature of hospital performance and weight these dimensions differently according 
to the importance for the hospital. For example, academic hospitals are likely to pay more attention to teaching and research 
quality than hospitals performing no teaching or research activities. This then overcomes some of the hospital performance 
measurement difficulties associated with a cross-sectional sample where organisational effectiveness may be affected by 
other factors. 
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established (Bisbe et al., 2007; Henri, 2006; Widener 2007), we formed one- and two-factor 
models and ran a chi-square differences test to determine which model fits the data better. 
The results showed that the two-factor model provided a significantly better fit than the one-
factor model (∆χ2 = 60.3, df = 1, p < .01). The two sets of fit indexes showed that the two-
factor model (CFI = .98, IFI = .98, NFI = .93, RMSEA = .06) fit the data better than the one-
factor model (CFI = .86, IFI = .86, NFI = .82, RMSEA = .15). Moreover, in the two-factor 
model, all items significantly loaded on their respective latent variables. These CFA results 
indicate that the conceptual distinction between the interactive and diagnostic uses of PMS 
had satisfactory discriminant and convergent validity. 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 3 contains a Pearson correlation matrix. As the table shows, none of the 
independent variables were significantly related to performance. We used hierarchical 
moderated regression analyses to test Hypotheses 1–6. Table 4 depicts the results of the 
regressions in which hospital performance is the dependent variable, and its predictor 
variables were entered in the following order: 
• Model 1: (step 1) control variables, (step 2) the two main effects, and (step 3) the two-
way interaction; 
• Model 2: (step 1) control variables, (step 2) the three main effects, (step 3) the three 
two-way interactions, and (step 4) the three-way interaction. 
Hypotheses 1 to 3, tested in Model 1, posit a positive effect on performance of the 
interaction between the styles of PMS use and the emphasis hospitals place on specific 
strategic priorities. As shown in Panel A (for Hypothesis 1), Panel B (for Hypothesis 2), and 
Panel C (for Hypothesis 3), none of the incremental R-squares calculated in Step 3 were 
statistically significant (∆R2 ≤ .005, p > .10). As such, Hypotheses 1 to 3 are not supported.  
Hypotheses 4 to 6 are tested in Model 2. Hypothesis 4 predicts a positive effect on 
performance of the interaction among the diagnostic use of PMS, emphasis on operations 
priority, and top-level managers’ personal background. As shown in Panel A, Step 4, the 
incremental R-square was not statistically significant (∆R2 = .001, p > .10). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Hypothesis 5 predicts a positive effect on performance of the 
interaction among the interactive use of PMS, the emphasis on partnership priority, and top-
level managers’ personal background. In support of Hypothesis 5, the results in Panel B, Step 
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4, show that adding this product term significantly increased the variance explained in 
hospital performance (∆R2 = .025,  p < .01). Finally, Hypothesis 6 predicts a positive effect 
on performance of the interaction among the interactive use of PMS, the emphasis on 
governance priority, and top-level managers’ personal background. Panel C, Step 4, contains 
results that support Hypothesis 6, indicating that adding the three-way interaction 
significantly increased the variance explained in hospital performance (∆R2 = .026,  p < .01). 
Figures 1 to 3 show the results of a simple slope analysis for each regression line used 
to examine the interactions predicted in Hypotheses 4 to 6, respectively. Figure 1 shows no 
significant differences in slope between the diagnostic use of PMS and hospital performance 
when the emphasis on operations priority is high and when the personal background is 
administrative. In line with Hypotheses 5 and 6, Figures 2 and 3 show that when the emphasis 
on partnership or governance priority is high and when the personal background is clinical, 
the interactive use of PMS has the strongest positive relationship with hospital performance. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3–4 about here 
Insert Figures 1–3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study is an attempt to respond to recent calls for a better understanding of the 
factors that support the effectiveness of MCS in healthcare organisations (Abernethy et al., 
2007; King and Clarkson, 2015), particularly performance measurement systems in hospitals 
(Aidemark and Funck, 2009; Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013). To do so, we analysed the 
two following research questions: (1) do the interactions between the use of PMS and 
strategic priorities have an impact on hospital performance, and (2) do top-level managers’ 
personal backgrounds play a role in these interactions? A hierarchical moderated regression 
analysis of survey data collected from top-level managers in Belgian hospitals produced 
several key findings. 
A general finding is that the interactions between the use of PMS and strategic 
priorities (regardless of the personal background) have no performance effect but the 
interactions between the uses of PMS, strategic priorities, and top-level managers’ personal 
background affect hospital performance. We found that this performance effect is more 
positive for top-level managers with a clinical background than for those with an 
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administrative background. This general finding extends previous research on the use of 
MCS in hospitals in three ways. First, we provide empirical evidence that combining hospital 
strategies, the use of MCS, and top-level managers’ personal background in the same model 
to shed light on drivers of hospital performance offers greater explanatory power than 
focusing on one determinant alone or the interactions between hospital strategies and the use 
of MCS alone. The combination of different theoretical perspectives (e.g., institutional and 
top-level manager perspectives) seems to offer a more complete understanding of the 
effectiveness of MCS in hospitals than does one perspective in isolation. This finding is in 
line with a recent call to adopt a multi-theoretical approach to management control research 
(Krishnan, 2010). Second, the empirical results in this paper suggest that, in the hospital 
sector reflected by tensions between dominant operational and administrative forms of 
management and leadership, MCS-strategy relationships are more complicated than 
contingency-based research assumes (Schoonhoven, 1981). Our results suggest that it is the 
top-level managers’ personal background that brings to life the benefits of the alignment 
between the use of PMS and strategic priorities in hospital. These results illustrate the 
importance of considering the personal backgrounds and traits of the performance 
information user. Studies that concentrates on only the MCS-strategy fit in hospitals may 
assert that hospital performance is improved but, when controlling for personal background 
and traits of the performance information user, the performance effect is no longer 
significant. Finally, we show that integrating clinicians into the management structure does 
not harm a hospital’s competitive advantage. Top-level managers with a clinical background 
are not necessarily managers looking for power and influence to circumvent the 
implementation of some strategic priorities or manipulate elements of MCS, as suggested by 
the political model of organisational behaviour (Abernethy and Vagnoni, 2004); they are also 
managers who strive to achieve hospital objectives. 
Specific findings also support previous research and offer potentially new insights into 
controlling healthcare organisations. First, this study indicates that the interaction among 
operations priority, the diagnostic use of PMS, and personal background has no significant 
effect on hospital performance. At the two-way interaction level, there is no significant 
performance effect of the interaction between the diagnostic use of PMS and the operations 
priority, nor between the diagnostic use of PMS and personal background. However, the 
results indicate that hospital performance is better when top-level managers with a clinical 
background implement an operations priority than when their peers with an administrative 
background do so. These results are consistent with the idea that top-level managers with an 
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administrative background do not have sufficient clinical expertise to make optimal decisions 
on clinically related matters compared with their peers with a clinical background (Abernethy 
and Lillis, 2001; Llewellyn, 2001). In addition, top-level managers with a clinical background 
tend to make more optimal decisions on operations-related issues (compared with top-level 
managers with an administrative background) by diagnostically using other formal 
information-based routines and procedures or more informal sources of information, which is 
a finding consistent with upper echelons theory and the prediction that clinician managers 
adopt different approaches to control subordinates and make decisions compared with other 
managers (Abernethy et al., 2007). 
Second, the three-way interaction among partnership priority, interactive use of PMS, 
and personal background significantly affects hospital performance. This result supports the 
key role of top-level managers with a clinical background in the creation, development, and 
maintenance of fluid relationships across various healthcare provider organisations within 
well-defined communities based on the non-invasive, facilitating, and inspirational use of 
PMS. Moreover, although the (un-hypothesised) main effect of governance priority on 
hospital performance is negative, the interaction of this strategic priority, the interactive use 
of PMS, and personal background seems to benefit hospitals. Therefore, this study informs 
the debate on how to build effective governance structures in hospitals and helps explain why 
some hospitals perform better than others, given the governance priority they pursue 
(Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013; Eeckloo et al., 2004). 
Third, the (un-hypothesised) two-way interaction between the interactive use of PMS 
and personal background seems to contribute to hospital performance as well, regardless of 
the strategic priority the hospital pursues. This result suggests that clinical professionals do 
not necessarily reject the use of MCS (leading to ineffective strategy implementation), as 
previous research claims (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 
2006; Witman et al., 2010). In turn, this study supports arguments that personal background 
and interactive use are two factors that when properly combined, facilitate the effective 
recognition of MCS, such as PMS, in hospitals.  
However, this study is subject to some limitations. First, our empirical study considers 
the strategic priority an exogenous variable, without empirically addressing how the priority 
has been formulated and emphasised. Second, the results are based on a survey and thus 
suffer from survey-related limitations (Van der Stede et al., 2005). For example, our use of a 
cross-sectional survey prevents us from demonstrating causality. Another survey-related issue 
involves the reliability and validity of measurement instruments. Although we took 
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precautions before mailing questionnaires (e.g., use of validated scales, pre-tests of the 
instrument, pilot study) and verifications a posteriori (e.g., construct validity, checks of the 
measurement model) and did not find any evidence of reliability and validity problems, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of noise in the construct measures. Third, the generalisation of 
these results to other organisations operating in different national systems requires caution 
because Belgian hospitals exhibit important specificities. Although the tensions between 
operational and administrative forms of management and leadership reported in our study are 
also observed in other professional service firms (e.g., universities, schools, consultancy 
firms), different industries and healthcare systems might reveal different specificities 
potentially leading to different results. 
Our empirical study could also be extended in several respects. For this study, we 
regarded PMS as a package comprising a set of financial and nonfinancial metrics. However, 
we did not explore the nature of those metrics. Further research could examine which metrics 
are used interactively or diagnostically and how top-level managers with different personal 
backgrounds (i.e., clinical versus administrative) react to specific isolated and aggregated 
metrics. We examined styles of PMS use with quantitative empirical data collected from 
members of the hospital industry. A longitudinal study might corroborate the relationship 
among hospital strategies, personal backgrounds, uses of PMS, and performance. 
Furthermore, despite the substantial stream of literature related to the design of incentive 
systems for lower-level managers, we note poor attention to the relationship between the use 
of PMS and incentive systems for physicians in public hospitals. This relationship may be 
problematic, considering the difficulties associated with aligning performance metrics, 
organisational strategies, and goals with highly specialised, powerful, and influential 
physicians who develop professional activities in bureaucratic organisations that are often 
forced to rely on the decreasing financial resources provided by public authorities. This study 
could also benefit from further investigations into other (formal and informal) control 
practices in hospitals. Finally, this study was conducted specifically in the Belgian healthcare 
system; researchers should perform similar studies in different national healthcare systems to 
generalise our findings. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Questionnaire items, factor analysis, loadings, reliability, and validity statistics for the constructs. 
Strategic priorities: To what extent are the mentioned problems the focus of management attention and resources and are 
considered of critical importance now? (Scale: 1 = Not at all, 3 = Average, 5 = To a great extent) 
 
1 2 3 4 
Secure financial resources .652 .214 -.161 .147 
Meet the hospital activity targets .686 .115 .256 .156 
Keep medical stars in the hospital  .706 .022 .189 .211 
Attain profitability or market share goals  .706 .309 .092 .111 
Manage information systems  .270 .612 .081 .262 
Reduce the administrative burden and red tape  .071 .789 .216 .026 
Develop internal control procedures  .105 .781 .133 .138 
Develop customer services or service support .280 .382 .626 -.081 
Develop a reliable network of doctors or partnerships .178 .234 .678 .130 
Find new top-level managers  -.031 -.206 .378 .621 
Define the organisation roles, responsibilities and policies .328 .286 .041 .791 
Define the roles and responsibilities of top-level managers  .133 .273 .065 .874 
Develop a new medical service .561 .151 .235 -.065 
Attract capable personnel .170 .117 .568 .412 
Maintain adequate facilities and/or space -.020 .245 .491 .233 
To have a sufficient number of doctors  .529 .001 .550 -.027 
Penetrate new geographic territories  .361 .496 .269 .007 
Be a known hospital  .329 .477 .353 .101 
Factor loading 6.051 1.651 1.418 1.248 
Percentage of variance explained 33.6% 9.2% 7.9% 6.9% 
Cronbach’s alpha (α) .763 .726 .662 .814 
Diagnostic use of PMS: Currently, to what extent do you use your hospital scorecard to… (Scale: 1 = Not at all, 3 = 
Average, 5 = To a great extent) 
Track progress towards goals .851      
Monitor results .789      
Compare outcomes to expectations .832      
Review key measures .832      
Factor loading 2.730      
Percentage of variance explained 68.3%      
Cronbach’s alpha (α) .845      
Interactive use of PMS: Currently, to what extent do you use your hospital scorecard to… (Scale: 1 = Not at all, 3 = 
Average, 5 = To a great extent) 
 Factor 1 Factor 2   
Set and negotiate goals and targets .803 .135   
Debate data assumptions and action plans .848 .040   
Signal key strategic areas for improvement .861 -.011   
Challenge new ideas and ways of doing tasks .764 .254   
Involve in permanent discussion with subordinates .637 .508   
Serve as a learning tool .032 .959   
Factor loading 3.321 1.036   
Percentage of variance explained 55.3% 17.3%   
Cronbach’s alpha (α)† .861    
Notes: Table 1 presents the results of factor analysis by construct. We ran a principal components analysis with Varimax 
rotation run in IBM SPSS Statistics (v.20). We extracted all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 and indicated the 
variance explained for each factor. For ease of presentation, loadings > .6, considered in the regressions, are in boldface. The 
factor loading, percentage of variance explained, and Cronbach's α are reported for each construct. 1 = Administration 
priority; 2 = Operations priority; 3 = Partnership priority; 4 = Governance priority. †Cronbach’s α was calculated with the 
five items that loaded on factor 1. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
Constructs and indicators Theoretical 
range 
Practical 
range Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Diagnostic use of PMS      
To track progress towards goals 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.79 4.00 .962 
To monitor results 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.83 4.00 .940 
To compare outcomes to expectations 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.68 4.00 .988 
To review key measures 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.98 4.00 .924 
Interactive use of PMS      
To set and negotiate goals and targets 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.51 4.00 1.080 
To debate data assumptions and action plans 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.70 4.00 1.011 
To signal key strategic areas for improvement 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.81 4.00 .899 
To challenge new ideas and ways of doing tasks 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.34 3.00 .969 
To involve in permanent discussion with subordinates 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.15 3.00 1.077 
Administration priority      
Secure financial resources 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 4.06 4.00 .903 
Meet the hospital activity targets 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 4.14 4.00 .860 
Keep medical stars in the hospital 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.84 4.00 1.115 
Attain profitability or market share goals 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.79 4.00 .918 
Operations priority      
Manage information systems 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.97 4.00 .890 
Reduce the administrative burden and red tape 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.32 3.00 .963 
Develop internal control procedures 1.00-5.00 2.00-5.00 3.64 4.00 .856 
Partnership priority      
Develop customer services or service support 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.28 3.00 1.055 
Develop a reliable network of doctors or partnerships 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.91 4.00 .919 
Governance priority      
Find new top-level managers 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.25 3.00 1.159 
Define the organisation roles, responsibilities and policies 1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.80 4.00 .883 
Define the roles and responsibilities of top-level 
managers 
1.00-5.00 1.00-5.00 3.81 4.00 .982 
Top-level managers’ personal background .00-1.00     
Hospital performance Ʃ(score × weight) .00-3.00 1.43-3.00 2.36 2.39 .358 
Financial health .00-9.00 3.00-9.00 6.93 6.00 1.986 
Ability to attract doctors and nurses .00-9.00 1.00-9.00 6.24 6.00 2.066 
Reputation of the hospital .00-9.00 1.00-9.00 6.72 6.00 2.199 
(under) Graduate medical/health professional teaching .00-9.00 0.00-9.00 4.83 4.00 2.805 
Research .00-9.00 0.00-9.00 2.99 2.00 2.904 
Quality of care (e.g., patients readmission rate) .00-9.00 2.00-9.00 7.52 9.00 1.782 
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Table 3 
Pearson correlation coefficients. 
 DPMS IPMS ADM OPE PAR GOV BACK PERF SIZE STAT TYPE AGE 
IPMS .608**            
ADM .153 .170           
OPE .075 .221* .398**          
PAR .182* .240** .446** .514**         
GOV -.029 .104 .375** .382** .297**        
BACK -.215* -.209* -.002 .099 .146 .123       
PERF .102 .126 .154 .051 .087 -.087 -.071      
SIZE .223* .153 -.017 .102 .130 -.080 .043 .167     
STAT -.171 -.108 -.039 -.037 -.148 .147 -.032 .039 -.208*    
TYPE .028 .141 .107 .053 .036 -.115 -.025 -.071 .288** .087   
AGE -.011 -.036 -.019 .053 .145 .133 .142 .110 .141 -.049 -.140  
LOC .046 .063 -.158 .196* .117 -.297** -.032 .043 .136 -.376** -.042 -.089 
Notes: DPMS = Diagnostic use of PMS; IPMS = Interactive use of PMS; ADM = Administration priority; OPE = Operations priority; PAR = 
Partnership priority; GOV = Governance priority; BACK = Personal background; PERF = Performance of the hospital; SIZE = Size of the hospital; 
STAT = Status of the hospital (private or public); TYPE = Type of hospital (general or specialised); AGE = Age of the respondent; LOC = Location 
of the hospital (Wallonia or otherwise). **, *: Significant at p < .01, .05, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Hierarchical regression results for Hypotheses 1-6. 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Steps and independent variables β (t-stat.) Total R2 ∆R2  β (t-stat.) Total R2 ∆R2 
      
    
Panel A - Hypotheses 1 and 4     
Step 1. Control variables     
SIZE .209  (2.101)** .209  (2.101)**   
STAT .180  (1.791)* .180  (1.791)*   
TYPE -.201 (-2.029)** -.201 (-2.029)**   
AGE .107  (1.126) .107  (1.126)   
LOC .050    (.485) .050    (.485)   
ADM .264  (2.439)** .264  (2.439)**   
GOV -.228 (-2.162)** -.228 (-2.162)**   
PAR -.007   (-.066) -.007   (-.066)   
IPMS  .123  (1.302) .123  (1.302)   
  .145   .145  
Step 2. Main effects      
DPMS -.054   (-.452) -.061   (-.506)   
OPE -.021   (-.178) -.018   (-.152)   
BACK  -.048   (-.496)   
  .147 .002   .149 .004 
Step 3. Two-way interaction(s)      
DPMS × OPE .026  (.260) .119  (1.089)   
DPMS × BACK  .102    (.963)   
BACK × OPE  .183  (1.717)*   
  .148 .001   .184 .035 
Step 4. Three-way interaction      
DPMS × OPE × BACK  .055    (.366)   
    .185 .001 
 
 
    
Panel B - Hypotheses 2 and 5      
Step 1. Control variables      
SIZE .213  (2.090)** .213  (2.090)**   
STAT .175  (1.719)* .175  (1.719)*   
TYPE -.185 (-1.856)* -.185 (-1.856)*   
AGE .102  (1.080) .102  (1.080)   
LOC .059    (.533) .059    (.533)   
ADM .269  (2.505)** .269  (2.505)**   
GOV -.212 (-1.898)* -.212 (-1.898)*   
OPE .000   (-.002) .000   (-.002)   
DPMS  .040    (.425) .040    (.425)   
  .133   .133  
Step 2. Main effects      
IPMS  .156  (1.311) .147  (1.221)   
PAR .001    (.005) .009    (.079)   
BACK  -.048   (-.496)   
 .147 .014   .149 .016 
Step 3. Two-way interaction(s)     
IPMS × PAR .080    (.775) .089    (.837)   
IPMS × BACK .206  (1.978)*   
BACK × PAR .016    (.156)   
 .152 .005   .191 .042* 
Step 4. Three-way interaction     
IPMS × PAR × BACK .221 (1.805)**   
   .216 .025*** 
 
    
Panel C - Hypotheses 3 and 6     
Step 1. Control variables     
SIZE .216  (2.082)** .216  (2.082)**   
STAT .162  (1.564) .162  (1.564)   
TYPE -.151 (-1.515) -.151 (-1.515)   
AGE .089    (.916) .089    (.916)   
LOC .126  (1.178) .126  (1.178)   
ADM .229  (2.041)** .229  (2.041)**   
PAR -.013   (-.109) -.013   (-.109)   
OPE -.075   (-.658) -.075   (-.658)   
DPMS  .053    (.553) .053    (.553)   
  .104   .104  
Step 2. Main effects      
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IPMS  .156  (1.311) .147  (1.221)   
GOV -.230 (-2.031)** -.226 (-1.983)**   
BACK   -.048   (-.496)   
  .147 .043*   .149 .045* 
Step 3. Two-way interaction(s)      
IPMS × GOV .038    (.380) .011    (.108)   
IPMS × BACK  .214  (2.119)**   
BACK × GOV  -.041   (-.422)   
  .148 .001   .187 .038 
Step 4. Three-way interaction      
IPMS × GOV × BACK  .182  (1.834)**   
    .213 .026*** 
Notes: DPMS = Diagnostic use of PMS; IPMS = Interactive use of PMS; ADM = Administration priority; OPE = Operations 
priority; PAR = Partnership priority; GOV = Governance priority; BACK = Personal background; PERF = Performance of the 
hospital; SIZE = Size of the hospital; STAT = Status of the hospital (private or public); TYPE = Type of hospital (general or 
specialised); AGE = Age of the respondent; LOC = Location of the hospital (Wallonia or otherwise). Max VIF = 2.999. ***, **, *: 
Significant at p < .01, .05, .10, respectively (one-tailed for the variable with predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise). Standardised 
coefficients are presented for all independent variables. 
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Appendix A 
Profile of the respondents. 
  CEO (N = 69)   M.D. (N = 42) 
Seniority in the hospital (average in years) 16  23 
Tenure in this position (average in years) 10  11 
Age (average in years) 52  54 
Type of hospital N (%)   
General hospital 68 (58)   
Psychiatric hospital 36 (31)   
Geriatric hospital 1 (01)   
Specialised hospital 8 (07)   
University hospital 4 (03)   
Status of the hospital N (%)   
Private 91 (78)   
Public 26 (22)   
Location of the hospital N (%)   
Wallonia 38 (33)   
Brussels 11 (09)   
Flanders 68 (58)   
Size of the hospital (number of beds) N (%)   
Fewer than 100 7 (06)   
Between 100 and 199 25 (21)   
Between 200 and 499 53 (45)   
Between 500 and 999 23 (20)   
More than (and equal to) 1 000 9 (08)   
Diversity of the hospital 
(number of different medical services) N (%)   
Fewer than 5 20 (17)   
Between 5 and 8 64 (55)   
Between 9 and 12 30 (26)   
Between 13 and 18 3 (02)   
Notes: This appendix reports the profile of 117 identifiable survey respondents. In 
six cases, the respondents deleted their personal identification code on the 
questionnaire, which precludes us from describing their profiles. MD = medical 
director. 
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